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Many thanks for your and the reviewers’ comments on my ‘Interviewing to detect 
deception’ article. They were helpful in improving the paper and below I explain what I 
have done. I noticed that you did a very good job in summarising the reviewers’ 
comments so by addressing your seven comments I believe I have covered all the issues 
raised by the reviewers. 
1) I have given examples of cues on pages 8, 10 and 14 and as well as in other 
places. 
2) I have added a section ‘Theories about lying and cognition’ and included 
virtually all the references the reviewer gave. 
3) In addition to point 2, I have added relevant work of others in the field, including 
Cognitive Interview and Reality Interview lie detection research. I have also 
added research on the use of drawings. 
4) I have noted your fourth point, thank you for your support. 
5) I have added a paragraph about using students. 
6) I have added an example in the SUE section. 
7) I had trouble finding redundant introduction texts and repetitions, and, in fact, 
only found one which I have deleted. I am happy to delete more of these if you 
can point out where they are? 
 
I hope you agree with me that the paper has improved significantly and hope that the 
current version meets your expectations. 
 
I look forward to hearing from you and best wishes, 
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Aldert 
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Abstract 
DePaulo et al.’s (2003) meta-analysis of verbal and nonverbal cues to deception 
showed that cues to deception are faint and unreliable. If liars do not spontaneously 
display diagnostic cues to deceit, a logical step is to make sure that investigators elicit 
or enhance such cues in interviews through specific interview technique. Such 
interview techniques were scarce in the nonverbal and verbal cues to deception 
domain, but recently researchers have developed alternative protocols which have 
their roots in cognition and based on the assumption that questions can be asked that 
are more difficult for liars to answer than for truth tellers. They will be discussed in 
the first part of this article.  
Traditionally, lie detection in a forensic context concentrated on police -
suspect interview settings. However, in the wake of high profile international terrorist 
attacks, the importance of identifying terrorist networks and gathering intelligence 
about the activities of such groups became paramount. Deception detection in 
intelligence interviews differs in several ways from deception detection in traditional 
police - suspect interviews and requires innovative deception research. In the second 
part of this article we will discuss the emerging literature in this domain.  
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Interviewing to Detect Deception 
Introduction 
 In 2003 Bella DePaulo and her colleagues published their meta-analysis of 
verbal and nonverbal cues to deception (DePaulo et al., 2003). The meta-analysis 
included 50 verbal and nonverbal cues that were examined in five or more deception 
studies. Of these 50 cues, 14 (28%) showed a significant relationship with deception. 
The average effect size of these 14 significant cues was d = .25. In Cohen’s (1988, 
1992) widely cited discussions of effect sizes he stated that d-values around .20 
represent a small effect and argued that a small effect is a barely perceptible but real 
difference. He gave as an example the difference in height between 15- and 16-year-
old girls (Cohen, 1988; Rice & Harris, 2005). Given that most verbal and nonverbal 
cues do not appear to be related to deception at all and that those that are related only 
show a weak relationship with deception, the conclusion from this meta-analysis is 
that cues to deception are faint and unreliable. 
If liars do not spontaneously display diagnostic cues to deceit, a logical step is 
to make sure that investigators elicit or enhance such cues in interviews through 
specific interview techniques (Vrij & Granhag, 2012). Such interview techniques 
were scarce in the nonverbal and verbal cues to deception domain, with perhaps the 
Behavior Analysis Interview (Horvath, Blair, & Buckley, 2008; Horvath, Jayne, & 
Buckley, 1994; Inbau, Reid, Buckley, & Jayne, 2013) being an exception. Such 
techniques are common in the physiological lie detection literature with the 
Comparison Question Test (CQT) being the most popular test.  
The CQT is an anxiety based test and so, in part, is the BAI. The assumption 
in anxiety-based tests is that liars are more anxious or nervous than truth tellers and 
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will therefore display physiological cues to anxiety (increased heart rate, heightened 
blood pressure, increased galvanic skin response) or nonverbal cues related to 
nervousness (gaze aversion, shifting position, increase in movements). Related to 
anxiety-based lie detection, the US National Research Council (NRC) published their 
report in 2003 in which they concluded that there is no satisfactory theoretical 
explanation as to why psychological states such as fear or anxiety would necessarily 
be stronger in liars than in truth tellers. It made some scholars realise that anxiety-
based interview protocols, grounded on the premise that liars are more anxious than 
truth tellers, are inadequate to distinguish truth tellers from liars. These scholars have 
argued for a change in direction (Vrij & Granhag, 2012) and have developed 
alternative interview protocols which have their roots in cognition and based on the 
assumption that questions can be asked that are more difficult for liars to answer than 
for truth tellers. Three different cognitive based lie detection techniques have emerged 
to date: (i) imposing cognitive load, (ii) asking unanticipated questions, and (iii) using 
evidence in a strategic manner. They will be discussed in the first part of this article.  
Traditionally, lie detection in a forensic context concentrated on police -
suspect interview settings. The obvious reason for this is that in criminal 
investigations about offences such as theft, assault, arson and murder, it is often 
critical to know whether the suspect is lying or telling the truth. However, in the wake 
of high profile international terrorist attacks, the importance of identifying terrorist 
networks and gathering intelligence about the activities of such groups became 
paramount. In addition, intelligence interviewing is often about the prevention of a 
crime rather than dealing with the aftermaths of a crime. Such information often 
comes from interviewing individuals about issues other than ‘traditional crimes’ and 
many of these interviews take place outside the police station, including at country 
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borders, security checkpoints, bus terminals, train stations, shopping malls, and sports 
venues (Cooke & Winner, 2008; Driskell, Salas, & Driskell, 2012; Kimery, 2008). 
Again, it is often critical to determine in these interviews whether these individuals 
are truthful.  
Deception detection in intelligence interviews differs in several ways from 
deception detection in traditional police - suspect interviews (Vrij & Granhag, 2012; 
Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010). For example, in police - suspect interviews 
investigators typically focus on a suspect’s past activities, but in intelligence settings 
investigators are often interested in someone’s future activities (e.g., intentions). 
Another difference is that in intelligence settings investigators, and particularly those 
who are working in an undercover capacity, sometimes have good reason not to tell 
the interviewees that the ‘chat’ they have with them is in fact an interview. A third 
difference is that terrorist acts are often planned and executed by groups rather than 
individuals. A fourth difference is that police suspect interviews are typically focused 
on solving crimes through obtaining admissions or confessions from suspects, 
whereas intelligence interviews are more about gathering information. In the second 
part of this article we will discuss the emerging literature in those four areas.  
The two parts of this article are clearly linked. Loftus (2011) argued that in 
interviewing individuals for intelligence purposes investigators need to worry about 
using oppressive interview techniques that could result in false confessions and false 
information. Anxiety-based interview techniques are oppressive in nature and run this 
risk, as we will show in this article. In addition, if undercover interviewers do not 
wish to reveal that they are actually interviewing someone, they need to have an 
informal chat with a person. Informal chats are by definition not oppressive in nature 
and, therefore, oppressive interviews are often inappropriate in intelligence 
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interviewing. The cognitive lie detection techniques discussed in the first part of the 
article are embedded in the information-gathering interview approach, an approach 
that is not oppressive and encourages interviewees to talk, which is exactly the 
intention in intelligence interviews.  
Interviewing to Detect Deception: A Cognitive Approach 
Theories about Lying and Cognition 
 In their seminal paper about cues to deception, Zuckerman, DePaulo and 
Rosenthal (1981) introduced ‘cognitive processing’ as one of four factors that are 
associated with deception (the other factors were ‘emotion’, ‘arousal’ and ‘control’). 
Cognition is also considered to be one of the main deception factors in Buller and 
Burgoon’s (1996) Interpersonal Deception Theory, DePaulo’s Self-Presentational 
Perspective (DePaulo, 1992; DePaulo et al., 2003) and in Ekman’s (1985/2009) work.  
 Several theoretical models about deception focus specifically on the role of 
cognition. Walczyk and colleagues introduced the Activation-Decision-Construction 
Model or ADCM and argued that the conscious decision to lie, inhibiting the truth, 
and formulating the lie are all considered to be cognitively demanding (Walczyk, 
Roper, Seemann, & Humphrey, 2003; Walczyk, Schwartz, Clifton, Adams, & Zha, 
2005).  
 Gombos (2006) states that two executive processes play a primary role in 
deception which make lying cognitively more demanding: control mechanisms of 
thought (e.g., inhibition of the truth) and active management (tracking the reactions of 
the interviewer and modifying their own behaviour and speech to maintain the lie).  
 The role of executive processes in deception also became evident in a meta-analysis 
of deception related fMRI research. By analysing the results of thirteen fMRI 
deception studies Christ and colleagues examined the role of working memory, 
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inhibitory control and task switching in deception. Their analysis revealed that 
executive processes, and particularly working memory, play an integral role in 
deception (Christ, Van Essen, Watson, Brubaker, & McDermott, 2009).  
 Sporer and Schwandt (2006) introduced a cognitive load/ working memory 
theoretical model of deception. It states that liars have to multi-task because they (i) 
need to plan what they are saying, attempt not to contradict themselves or the 
knowledge of the observer and also (ii) need to observe the listener’s reactions and 
(iii) attempt to control their own behaviour and speech so that they can make a 
credible impression. Sporer and Schwandt further acknowledge that not all lies are 
equally difficult to formulate. For example, a prepared or rehearsed lie is easier to 
formulate than an unprepared or unrehearsed lie (practicing makes lying easier, see 
also van Bockstaele et al., 2012; Verschuere, Spruyt, Meijer, & Otgaar, 2011); and it 
is easier to tell a lie in which the liar changes only a minor but important detail in an 
otherwise truthful story (e.g., change the date when the recalled activity took place), 
rather than making up an entire story. Taking this a step further, lying can sometimes 
even be easier than telling the truth (McCornack, 1997; Sporer & Schwandt, 2006). 
Walczyk, Igou, Dixon and Tcholakian (2013) list several factors that add cognitive 
load to truth telling, including when memories have not been accessed for a long time, 
or when a truthful response requires elaboration or qualification, or the generation of a 
novel opinion. However, as we will argue below, investigators can elicit lengthy, 
spontaneous and unrehearsed answers from liars which should make lying mentally 
taxing.  
Lying Can Be More Cognitively Taxing than Truth Telling  
 Lying can be more cognitively demanding than truth telling (Vrij, Fisher, Mann, 
& Leal, 2006; 2008; Vrij et al., 2008). First, formulating the lie may be cognitively 
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demanding. A liar needs to invent a story and must monitor their fabrication so that it 
is plausible and adheres to everything the observer(s) know or might find out. 
Moreover, liars must remember what they have said to whom in order to maintain 
consistency. Liars should also refrain from providing new leads (Vrij, 2008). Second, 
liars are typically less likely than truth tellers to take their credibility for granted 
(Kassin, Appleby, & Torkildson-Perillo, 2010). As such, liars will be more inclined 
than truth tellers to monitor and control their demeanour in order to appear honest to 
the investigator, and such monitoring and controlling is cognitively demanding. Third, 
because liars do not take their credibility for granted, they may monitor the 
investigator's reactions carefully in order to assess whether they appear to be getting 
away with their lie (Buller & Burgoon, 1996), which requires cognitive resources. 
Fourth, liars may be preoccupied with the task of reminding themselves to role-play 
(DePaulo et al., 2003), which requires extra cognitive effort. Fifth, deception requires 
a justification whereas truth telling does not (Levine, Kim, & Hamel, 2010). People 
often decide to lie because they are too embarrassed to tell the truth (psychological 
reasons) or to gain material advantage or to avoid punishment (material reason) 
(DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996). Sixth, liars also have to suppress 
the truth whilst they are fabricating and this is also cognitively demanding (Spence et 
al., 2001). Finally, while activation of the truth often happens automatically, 
activation of the lie is more intentional and deliberate (Walczyk, Roper, Seemann, & 
Humphrey, 2003), and thus requires mental effort. 
 There is substantial evidence from various sources indicating that lying is indeed 
more cognitively demanding than truth telling. Participants who have been asked after 
being interviewed about the cognitive load they experienced during the interview have 
reported that lying is more cognitively demanding than telling the truth. This occurred 
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when the lie required lengthy, elaborative responses (e.g., Hartwig, Granhag, 
Strömwall, & Kronkvist, 2006; Vrij, Mann, & Fisher, 2006), but also when short 
responses were sufficient (Caso, Gnisci, Vrij, & Mann, 2005; Vrij, Mann, & Fisher, 
2006). In fMRI deception research participants are not allowed to speak while in the 
scanner. Instead, they have to press a “yes” or “no” button and are requested to lie by 
pressing the incorrect button. Nevertheless, a review of fMRI deception research 
revealed that deception is associated with higher brain activity than truth telling, 
particularly in prefrontal regions which are associated with executive processes such 
as working memory, inhibitory control, and task switching (Christ, Essen, Watson, 
Brubaker, and McDermott, 2009). Analyses of police interviews with real-life suspects 
suggest that lying is also often more cognitively demanding than truth telling. First, in 
those police interviews lies were accompanied by increased pauses, decreased 
blinking, and decreased hand and finger movements, all of which are signs of 
cognitive load (Mann, Vrij, & Bull, 2002; Vrij & Mann, 2003). Second, police 
officers who saw a selection of these police interviews (but did not know when the 
suspects were lying or truth telling) reported that the suspects appeared to be thinking 
harder when they lied than when they told the truth (Mann & Vrij, 2006). 
Imposing Cognitive Load 
 An investigator could exploit the differential levels of cognitive load that truth 
tellers and liars experience to discriminate more effectively between them. Liars who 
require more cognitive resources than truth tellers will have fewer cognitive resources 
left over. If cognitive demand is further raised, which could be achieved by making 
additional requests, liars may not be as good as truth tellers in coping with these 
additional requests (Vrij, Granhag, Mann, & Leal, 2011b; Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 
2010).  
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 One way to impose cognitive load is by asking interviewees to tell their stories 
in reverse order (e.g., ‘Please tell me what happened, but do this backwards and start 
with the last thing that you can remember happening?’). This increases cognitive load 
because (a) it runs counter to the natural forward-order coding of sequentially 
occurring events and (b) it disrupts reconstructing events from a schema (Gilbert & 
Fisher, 2006). In one experiment, half of the liars and truth tellers were requested to 
recall their stories in reverse order (Vrij et al., 2008), whereas no instruction was given 
to the other half of participants. More cues to deceit emerged in the reverse order 
(such as lack of spatial details, auditory details, contextual embeddings) than in the 
control conditions (decrease in hand/finger movement only). Observers who watched 
these videotaped interviews could distinguish between truths and lies better in the 
reverse order condition than in the control conditions. For example, in the reverse 
order experiment, 42% of the lies were correctly classified in the control condition, 
well below that typically found in verbal and nonverbal lie detection research, 
suggesting that the lie detection task was difficult. Yet, in the experimental condition 
60% of the lies were correctly classified, which is more than typically found in this 
type of lie detection research (Bond & DePaulo, 2006).  
The reverse order technique is one of the components of the Cognitive 
Interview (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992). The Cognitive Interview is a sophisticated 
interview technique based on memory theory, social dynamics and communication. 
The Cognitive Interview results in truthful examinees providing a more detailed and 
accurate recall of an experienced event (Fisher, 2010), and has been shown to elicit 
considerably more information than typical police or other recommended interview 
protocols (see Memon, Meissner, & Fraser, 2010, for a meta-analysis.)  Experimental 
deception studies in which the Cognitive Interview was compared with a ‘standard’ 
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interview revealed that ‘detail’ occurred as a cue to deceit more frequently in the 
Cognitive Interview than in the standard interview and that the Cognitive Interview 
facilitated lie detection (Colwell, Hiscock, & Memon, 2002; Hernandez-Fernaud & 
Alonso-Quecuty, 1997; Zimmerman, Veinott, Meissner, Fallon, & Mueller, 2010, but 
see Bembibre & Higueras (2011, 2012, for exceptions).  See also research into the 
Reality Interview, a permutation of the original Cognitive Interview (Ansarra et al., 
2011; Colwell, Hiscock-Anisman, Memon, Taylor, & Prewett, 2007; Suckle-Nelson 
et al., 2010). 
 Another type of additional request that could be introduced is asking 
interviewees to carry out a secondary task at the same time as recalling their stories. 
Carrying out two tasks simultaneously (storytelling and a secondary task unrelated to 
storytelling) is cognitively more difficult than carrying out one task (i.e., just 
storytelling), because in the former situation interviewees need to divide their 
attention between the two tasks (Johnston, Greenberg, Fisher, & Martin, 1970; Smith, 
1969). For example, interviewees could be asked to recall their stories while 
conducting a computer driving simulation task or driving a real car. Liars may find 
this dual task more cognitively difficult than truth tellers and may not cope as well 
with this request. More pronounced differences between truth tellers and liars in story 
telling may thus occur in the driving condition compared to the control condition. 
Two studies to date have found support for this assumption, and both measured reaction 
times. Debey, Verschuere and Crombez (2012) introduced a hand grip task whereby 
participants were required to squeeze a spring-loaded handgrip for as long as possible. 
Squeezing a handgrip is a measure of muscular strength and self-control, becomes 
tiring after a short period of time, and participants must pay attention to this task by 
exerting self-control to override the urge to quit. Liars’ reaction times in a deception 
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test were more affected by these lapses of attention than truth tellers’ reaction times. 
In Visu-Petra, Varga, Miclea, and Visu-Petra’s (2013) experiment, truth tellers’ and 
liars’ reaction times were measured in a recognition test under standard conditions or 
under conditions in which additional tasks were introduced (e.g., pressing a key once 
or twice depending on whether the answers were written in bold or italics). Liars’ 
reaction times were longer than those of truth tellers, particularly in the conditions 
that contained interfering tasks.  
Asking Unanticipated Questions 
 A consistent finding in deception literature is that liars prepare themselves for 
possible interviews by thinking of answers to questions they expect to be asked 
(Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007). The strategy of preparing answers to possible 
questions makes sense. Planning makes lying easier, and planned lies typically contain 
fewer cues to deceit than do spontaneous lies (DePaulo et al., 2003). However, the 
positive effects of planning will only emerge if liars correctly anticipate which questions 
will be asked. Investigators can exploit this limitation by asking questions that liars do 
not anticipate. Though liars can refuse to answer unanticipated questions, such “I don’t 
know” or “I can’t remember” responses will create suspicion and should therefore be 
avoided if the questions are about central aspects of the target event. A liar, therefore, 
has little option other than to fabricate a plausible answer on the spot, which is 
cognitively demanding. For liars, expected questions should be easier to answer than 
unexpected questions, because liars can give their planned and rehearsed answers to the 
expected questions but they need to fabricate an answer to the unexpected questions. The 
difference liars experience in cognitive load while answering these two sets of questions 
should become evident in their verbal responses. In contrast, truth tellers experience 
similar levels of cognitive load while answering expected and unexpected questions, and 
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they should produce more comparable answers to the expected and unexpected questions 
than liars. In Lancaster, Vrij, Hope, and Waller (2012) truth tellers and liars were 
interviewed about their alleged activities in a room. Expected questions (e.g., ‘Tell me in 
as much detail as you can what you did in the room’) were followed by unexpected 
spatial and temporal questions (e.g., ‘Please describe exactly how you arranged the four 
objects you placed on the table at the centre of the room’). Liars gave significantly more 
detail to the expected questions than truth tellers and significantly less detail to the 
unexpected questions than truth tellers. As a result, the difference in detail between the 
expected and unexpected questions was larger in liars than in truth tellers and based on 
this difference score 78% of truth tellers and 83% of liars were correctly classified. 
The unexpected questions approach is also effective when interviewing pairs 
of suspects individually. In all likelihood pairs of guilty suspects have prepared 
possible answers to questions that will likely be asked. If these questions are indeed 
asked in the separate interviews, they will be able to give similar answers. If 
unexpected questions are asked, their answers are likely to differ from each other.  In 
Vrij et al. (2009) pairs of liars and pairs of truth tellers were interviewed individually 
about having had lunch together at a restaurant. Although the pairs of truth tellers did 
not have lunch together, the liars were instructed to pretend that they had. All pairs 
were given the opportunity to prepare for the interview. Typical opening questions 
were asked that the interviewees later said they had expected (e.g., “What did you do 
in the restaurant?”), followed by spatial questions (e.g., “In relation to the front door, 
where did you and your friend sit?”), temporal details (e.g., “Who finished their food 
first, you or your friend?”), and a request to draw the layout of the restaurant, which 
were all unexpected questions according to the interviewees. The pairs of liars 
showed the same amount of overlap in their responses to the expected opening 
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questions as the pairs of truth tellers, but less overlap than truth tellers in their 
responses to the unexpected questions. Based on overlap in answer to the spatial 
questions, 72% of pairs of truth tellers and liars could be classified (i.e., the answers 
were less alike for the pairs of liars than they were for the truth tellers). This 
demonstrates the potential of asking spatial questions for lie detection purposes. An 
even higher percentage of truth telling and lying pairs, 78%, could be correctly 
classified when assessing their drawings (i.e., the drawings were less alike for the 
pairs of liars than they were for the truth tellers). In summary, when liars have 
anticipated the questions their answers made them undistinguishable from truth 
tellers. Only asking unexpected questions about central topics led to identifiable 
betrayals for liars.   
Vrij et al. (2009), discussed in the previous paragraph, were the first 
researchers to use drawings as a lie detection tool, and since then more work has been 
carried out in this area (Leins, Fisher, & Vrij, 2012; Leins, Fisher, Vrij, Leal, & 
Mann, 2011; Roos af Hjelmsäter, Öhman, Granhag, & Vrij, in press; Vrij, Leal, 
Mann, Warmelink, Granhag, & Fisher, 2010; Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Fisher, 2012). Roos 
af Hjelmsäter and her colleagues found that for the unanticipated-questions technique 
to work only questions about core events should be asked (Roos af Hjelmsäter, 
Ohman, Granhag, & Vrij, in press). Adolescents (13-14 years-old) experienced in 
groups of three an encounter with a man near a statue (truth tellers) or they imagined 
this event (liars). In the subsequent interview, in which the adolescents were 
interviewed individually, they were asked to give a general verbal description of the 
event (anticipated task) or to produce spatial information by sketching (unanticipated 
task) from which direction the man had come (core event) or where each of the three 
group members had stood when talking to the man (peripheral event). The liars’ and 
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truth tellers’ verbal responses showed similar overlap, and so did their drawings about 
the peripheral elements of the task. However, liars’ drawings showed less overlap 
than the truth tellers’ drawings about the core event.  
Leins and colleagues (2011, 2012) explored the use of drawings in eliciting 
inconsistencies in liars’ responses. They asked their participants the same question 
twice albeit in different formats (verbal recall versus sketching). They found that liars 
showed more inconsistencies between verbal recall and drawing than truth tellers, 
which can be explained by the fact that truth tellers will have encoded the topic of 
investigation along more dimensions than liars. As a result, compared with liars, truth 
tellers should be able to recall the event more flexibly (along more dimensions). For 
this method to work it is crucial that the same question is asked in different 
dimensions (e.g., verbal recall versus sketching). Leins et al. (2012) found that when 
truth tellers and liars were asked to verbally recall the event twice or asked to sketch 
the event twice no differences emerged between truth tellers and liars.   
Vrij and colleagues (2010, 2012) compared the detail of verbal recalls and 
drawings when participants were asked to describe/sketch the layout of a location and 
other people. They found that truth tellers were more detailed when sketching a layout 
or people, the result of at least two factors. First, the request to sketch the layout of a 
location implies that an interviewee has to convey specific spatial information (e.g., a 
bin needs to be positioned in an exact location in the room, for example at the left 
hand side of the table), whereas such exact locations of an object are not a necessary 
requirement for a verbal description (‘e.g., there was a table with a bin next to it…’). 
Therefore when truthful interviewees verbally describe a room and the objects within, 
they may be less specific about the location of the objects or may not mention their 
location at all. In terms of sketching/describing who else was in the room, 
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idiosyncratic features of people (e.g., wearing glasses, having curly hair) were more 
often present in the truth tellers’ sketches than in their verbal recalls. In other words, 
the request to sketch people encouraged truth tellers to convey detailed information 
that they did not convey when asked to verbally describe these people. Since the truth 
tellers’ drawings were particularly detailed, differences between them and liars were 
most likely to occur in the drawing condition. Second, for truth tellers to judge 
whether they have conveyed all the information they know, they need to have an 
accurate understanding of the information they have conveyed. In a case where they 
have sketched the layout or people, that information is visible in the drawing. In a 
case where they have verbally recalled the layout or people, that information is not 
visible and the interviewee needs to build a mental picture of what s/he has said. 
Judging a drawing for omissions or completeness is easier than judging a mental 
picture for omissions or completeness, and omissions are therefore more easily 
noticed in drawings than in verbal recalls.  
The Strategic Use of Evidence 
 Liars (guilty suspects) and truth tellers (innocent suspects) generally enter 
interviews with different counter-interrogation strategies (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). 
Research suggests that liars are inclined to use avoidance strategies (e.g., avoiding 
mentioning where they were at a certain time) or denial strategies (e.g., denying 
having been at a certain place at a certain time when asked directly). In contrast, truth 
tellers are generally more forthcoming and “tell the truth like it happened” (Hartwig, 
Granhag & Strömwall, 2007). 
When investigators possess critical and possibly incriminating background 
information (evidence), they can exploit these differential truth tellers’ and liars’ 
strategies by introducing the available evidence during the interview in a strategic 
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manner (the Strategic Use of Evidence technique, SUE). When questions are asked 
about the evidence, guilty suspects tend to use more avoidance strategies, whereas 
innocent suspects use more forthcoming strategies (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008); 
hence, innocent suspects’ accounts will be more consistent with the available 
evidence than guilty suspects’ accounts.  
Granhag, Strömwall, Willén,  and Hartwig (2013) introduced the so-called 
Evidence Framing Matrix which suggests that when one piece of evidence is 
disclosed, two dimensions are particularly helpful in illuminating the different 
framing alternatives that exist. The first dimension is the strength of the source of the 
evidence, which can vary from weak (‘We have information that…’) to strong 
(‘CCTV footage shows that…’). The second dimension is the degree of precision of 
the evidence, which can vary from low (‘…you entered the train station’) to high 
(‘…you collected a package from a deposit box at the central station, ground floor 
level, on the 24
th
 of August at 7.30pm’). Granhag et al.’s (2013) found that using this 
matrix to reveal the evidence in a stepwise manner moving from the most indirect 
form of framing (weak source/low specificity, e.g., ‘We have information telling us 
that you recently visited the central station’) to the most direct form of framing 
(strong source/high specificity, e.g., ‘We have CCTV footage showing that you 
collected a package from a deposit box at the central station, ground floor level, on 
the 24
th
 of August at 7.30pm’) elicited more and stronger cues to deception than using 
the most direct form of framing only. When confronted with the direct form of 
framing at the first instance, liars may admit to collecting the package and may try to 
give an innocent explanation. Based on the notion that liars will use aversive 
strategies, it is unlikely that they will admit to collecting the package after being 
exposed to the most indirect form of framing. However, they are likely to change their 
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story when new evidence is presented so that their story continues to match the 
evidence. Such a response pattern results in within-statement inconsistencies.     
Police trainees were taught to use some basic elements of the SUE-technique. 
Results showed that participants who received training clearly outperformed their 
untrained colleagues: 85% vs. 56% deception detection performance (Hartwig, 
Granhag, Strömwall and Kronkvist 2006). The SUE-technique has been found to be 
successful in eliciting cues to deception (inconsistencies between statement and 
evidence) for adults and children, for single suspects and multiple suspects, and for 
suspects lying about their past actions and about their intentions (Vrij & Granhag, 
2012).  
Lie Detection in Intelligence Settings 
 Police – suspect interviews differ in certain important aspects from 
intelligence interviews. To gain understanding into deception and lie detection in 
intelligence settings, key aspects of intelligence settings need to be introduced and 
simulated in deception research. Researchers have only recently started to do this. 
This section outlines some of the key aspects of intelligence interviewing together 
with the first research output available in this domain.   
Lying about Intentions 
Most forensic deception research deals with lying about past activities. This 
makes sense because most of that research focuses on police interviewing and the 
police mostly interview suspects about their alleged past activities. However, in 
intelligence settings, being able to discriminate between true and false accounts about 
future activities (e.g., intentions) is of paramount importance, as this addresses the 
issue of preventing criminal acts from occurring, including terrorist attacks. Most of 
the lying about intentions research has been carried out by Pär Anders Granhag and 
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his colleagues, and that research is discussed elsewhere in this special issue (Granhag, 
in press). In this section, one experiment will be discussed with possibly significant 
implications (Warmelink, Vrij, Mann, Jundi, & Granhag, in press). In the experiment 
truth tellers and liars were interviewed about their alleged forthcoming trip. Anticipated 
questions about the purpose of the trip (e.g., “What is the main purpose of your trip?”), 
were followed by unanticipated questions about transport (e.g., “How are you going to 
travel to your destination?”), planning (“What part of the trip was easiest to plan?”), 
and the core event (“Keep in mind an image of the most important thing you are going 
to do on this trip. Please describe this mental image in detail?”). A pilot study 
indicated that these questions were genuinely unanticipated, and liars gave significantly 
more detail to the anticipated questions and significantly less detail to the unanticipated 
questions than truth tellers.  
This experiment has real life implications. Throughout the world immigration 
officers mainly ask purpose questions when quizzing passengers at airport border 
controls. In all likelihood they pay attention to the amount of detail passengers give, with 
the notion being that the richer an account is perceived to be in detail, the more likely 
it is to be believed (e.g., Bell & Loftus, 1989). However, purpose questions are 
expected by potential wrongdoers, for example, they appear in the al-Qaeda ‘Manchester 
Manual’, a manual for potential terrorists with information on how to avoid detection. 
Because purpose questions are expected, potential wrongdoers are able to answer such 
questions in detail and will subsequently make an honest impression on immigration 
officers.  
Interviewing without Being Noticed (Undercover Interviewing) 
In intelligence settings it may be useful to conduct interviews without the suspect 
actually knowing they are being interviewed. This is called undercover interviewing 
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(Vrij, Mann, Jundi, Hope, & Leal, 2012). Undercover interviewing may fit particularly 
well in terms of determining the veracity of an individual’s intentions. At the intentions 
stage, no crime has yet been committed, and a formal interview may therefore be 
inappropriate. In addition, in some investigative contexts, law enforcement and 
security personnel may have good reason to extract information from a suspect 
without them actually being aware that they are under investigation. In particular, law 
enforcement officers working as undercover agents and interacting with potential 
suspects in informal settings will not wish to draw attention to themselves or arouse 
suspicion about their motives by using direct question formats. For example, when an 
undercover officer has become embedded within a criminal gang or is required to 
interact with suspects to collect intelligence, the ability to elicit relevant information 
without detection is critical.  
The necessity to maintain undercover determines the questions that can be asked, 
and has several disadvantages and advantages in terms of lie detection. Starting with the 
disadvantages, interview tools that have shown to facilitate lie detection discussed in this 
article, such as asking a person to recall a story in reverse order, cannot be employed 
without making the suspect suspicious about the questioner’s motives. In terms of 
advantages, undercover interviewing creates the opportunity to ask questions that could 
be useful for lie detection purposes but which would not work in traditional overt 
interviews. For example, the undercover interviewer could invite suspects to engage in 
an apparently innocent activity that establishes their presence in a certain place at a 
certain time, such as asking whether the suspect would mind having a photograph taken 
that the interviewer could place on a website. Given that a plausible rationale for this 
request is provided (e.g. “I’ve just started a new business and I’m trying to build up my 
reputation as a photographer”) truth tellers and liars may well respond differently to this 
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seemingly innocuous compliance request. Research has shown that guilty people do not 
wish to be linked to their criminal activity and tend to ‘avoid and escape’ when asked 
about it (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008), and may therefore show greater reluctance to be 
photographed. 
Vrij, Mann, Jundi et al. et al. (2012) carried out the first undercover interviewing 
deception experiment ever published. In that experiment the participants were 
interviewed by a mock ‘undercover agent’, acting either as a doctoral student or as an 
amateur photographer. He approached either tourists (truth tellers) or participants who 
were on a mock reconnaissance mission (liars) at a hovercraft terminal, and asked them 
questions about their forthcoming trip to a nearby island. The liars had been instructed to 
prepare as a cover-story that they were going to visit the island as a tourist, and were 
given a tourist flyer about the island to prepare their cover story. The undercover 
interviewer asked the participants why they were visiting the island, at what time they 
were planning to come back, and to indicate on a blind map of the island the locations 
they planned to visit. He also asked their permission to take their photograph. Research 
has revealed that an individual who is about to execute his/her intention typically has a 
detailed mental representation of that intention (Trope & Liberman, 2003). This 
representation is more detailed than those of intentions the individual plans to execute at 
some later time (Trope & Liberman, 2003). It also differs from the mental 
representations of intentions that the person has not yet decided to execute (Ferguson & 
Bargh, 2004; Marsh, Hicks, & Bryan, 1999). Based on this, truth tellers may be more 
precise when describing their intentions (e.g., more references to exact timings) and may 
express more certainty in what they are going to do than liars.  People typically do not 
anticipate, and are thus unprepared for, spatial questions (Vrij et al., 2009). Therefore, 
such questions in particular should reveal deceit. In terms of visiting an island, it could 
                                                        Interviewing to detect deception 24 
be that liars identify which attractions they are supposedly going to visit but do not check 
specifically where they are located. As a result, liars may be less accurate than truth 
tellers in reporting exact locations of their alleged destinations on the island. In 
alignment with these predictions, truth tellers, compared to liars, gave more detailed 
answers, were more exact about the time at which they planned to return from the island, 
were more precise in indicating the exact locations of the places they were going to visit 
and were more willing to be photographed. When participants were asked after their 
encounter with the undercover agent about their experiences during the interview, they 
mentioned that they found only the request to have their photograph taken somewhat 
odd. In sum, this experiment revealed that undercover interviewing can be used 
effectively to detect deceit.  
In Vrij, Mann, Jundi et al. et al.’s (2012) experiment, as in most deception 
studies, the liars were university students and staff working at the university. Of course, 
this raises the question of whether similar results would be found with real terrorists. 
This is an empirical question worth examining, but we are hopeful that this will be the 
case.  For example, this experiment, as well as another deception experiments discussed 
earlier (Vrij et al., 2009) indicated that spatial questions are good for lie detection. Ali 
Soufan, an FBI interrogator, noticed exactly the same when interrogating terrorists 
(Soufan, 2011).  
Lying in Groups (Collective Interviewing) 
Terrorist acts are often planned and executed by groups rather than individuals 
(Crenshaw, 1990; Soufan, 2011). For example, the terrorists travelled together to 
London to carry out the London 2005 bombings. Therefore, investigators may wish to 
interview people at specific locations, such as in a shopping mall, at the entrance of a 
football stadium, at the entrance of the underground, or at a road border control. This 
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may then result in situations in which there is only one interviewer available but a 
group of suspects.  
Interviewing suspects collectively enables investigators to examine how group 
members communicate with each other when lying or truth telling. When pairs of 
truth tellers recall a jointly experienced event during an interview, they may 
communicate substantially with each other in an attempt to collectively recall all the 
details they know, and to correct each other’s stories. In this respect, Hollingshead 
(1998) refers to transaction information search, the idea that people in interpersonal 
relationships often have a specialised ‘division of labour’ with respect to encoding, 
storing, and retrieving information from different domains (Wegner, 1987). Truth 
tellers, having shared experience of an actual event, may naturally make use of this 
transactive memory by cuing one another, posing questions to one another, and 
verbalising connections asking each other questions that could tap into the other’s 
memory domain. In contrast, liars do not have a joint experience to recall. They may 
provide their prepared answers to anticipated questions, or if the questions were not 
anticipated, one person may take the lead and the other may simply agree with what is 
said. This is a far less interactive approach than the truth tellers’ approach, and, 
indeed, in two collective interviewing experiments to date, the pairs of liars made 
fewer additions, corrections and interruptions than the pairs of truth tellers ((Driskell, 
Salas, & Driskell, 2012; Vrij et al., 2012). Of course, interacting with each other is 
associated with mutual gaze. Two experiments revealed that truthful dyads gazed 
more at their partner than deceptive dyads (Driskell et al., 2012; Jundi et al., 2012). 
Jundi et al. (2012) also found that pairs of liars looked more at the interviewer than 
pairs of truth tellers. In sum, collective interviewing has shown promise in terms of lie 
detection because truthful and deceptive dyads communicate differently with each 
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other.  
Information-Gathering versus Accusatory Interviewing 
Whereas police interviews are sometimes aimed at obtaining confessions, 
intelligence interviews are mostly about gathering information (Borum, 2006; 
Brandon, 2011). A necessary condition for gathering information is that interviewees 
talk. Information-gathering interview protocols encourage interviewees to talk (Bull, 
2010; Fisher, 2010; Lamb, Hershkowitz, Orbach, & Esplin, 2008). They are amongst 
other aspects characterised by providing opportunities for uninterrupted recall 
(Meissner, 2011). The stereotypical view, often addressed in police manuals (e.g., 
Inbau et al., 2013) is that interviewees are reluctant to talk and that investigators need 
to use an accusatory approach to get them to talk, characterised by confrontation, and 
the use of minimisation and maximisation techniques (Meissner, 2011; Soufan, 2011). 
The view that an accusatory approach is required to get people to talk is by no means 
shared by all practitioners. For example, Soufan (2011), an experienced and 
successful American FBI interrogator who gathered valuable information from al-
Qaeda suspects, did not use an accusatory approach when interviewing them. Instead 
he used an information-gathering approach characterised by rapport building, truth 
seeking and listening. In addition, the Canadian police detective Tedeschini (2012) 
also advocates the information-gathering approach.  
 Research has shown that the idea that suspects in police interviews are 
unwilling to talk in information-gathering style interviews is a myth rather than fact. 
A systematic analysis of more than 1,067 information-gathering police interviews in 
the UK has shown that only 5% of the suspects remained silent (Moston, Stephenson, 
& Williamson, 1993). In addition, in his analysis of 600 information-gathering police 
interviews, Baldwin (1993) found that 80% of the suspects were thoroughly 
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cooperative and answered police questions of significance. Furthermore, a recent 
meta-analysis of field and laboratory studies about the influence of the 
interview/interrogation method on eliciting information, cues to deceit and confession 
outcomes revealed that information-gathering approaches elicited significantly more 
relevant information and significantly more diagnostic cues to deceit than accusatorial 
methods (Meissner, 2011; Meissner, Redlich, Bhatt, & Brandon, 2012). In addition, 
information-gathering approaches significantly increased the likelihood of true 
confessions and significantly decreased the likelihood of false confessions compared 
to accusatory approaches, and accusatory approaches significantly increased both true 
and false confessions compared to control conditions. In summary, research findings 
do not support the idea that suspects are reluctant to talk and that accusatory 
techniques are needed to yield success in interviews. On the contrary, an information-
gathering approach yields better results than an accusatory approach in obtaining 
relevant information, eliciting cues to deceit and obtaining confessions. 
Conclusion 
 This article has introduced cognitive lie detection. Three interview techniques 
were described; imposing cognitive load, asking unanticipated questions, and the 
strategic use of evidence that have in common that liars find them more difficult to 
cope with than truth tellers. This results in cues to deceit (deceptive statements lack 
detail and contain inconsistencies) and better discrimination between truth tellers and 
liars. All three interview techniques use an information-gathering interview style and 
they can be employed in a variety of settings, including in intelligence interviewing 
where the traditional oppressive accusatory interview style is often inappropriate.   
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